- (J) the Chair of the National Artificial Intelligence Advisory Committee's Subcommittee on Artificial Intelligence and Law Enforcement; and
- (K) representatives from civil society, including organizational leaders with expertise in technology, privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights, representatives from industry, and representatives from academia, as appointed by the President.
- (2) TASK FORCE CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR.—The President shall designate a Chair and Vice Chair of the AI Task Force from among its members.
- (c) DUTIES.—The AI Task Force shall carry out the following duties:
- (1) Identifying policy and legal gaps and making recommendations to ensure that uses of artificial intelligence (referred to in this section as "AI") and associated data in United States Government operations comport with freedom of expression, equal protection, privacy, and due process.
- (2) Assessing existing policy and legal gaps for current AI applications and making recommendations for—
- (A) legislative and regulatory reforms on the development and fielding of AI; and
- (B) institutional changes to ensure sustained assessment and recurring guidance on privacy and civil liberties implications of AI applications.
- (3) Conducting an assessment and making recommendations to Congress and to the President to ensure that the development and fielding of artificial intelligence by the Federal Government provides protections for the privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of individuals in the United States in a manner that is appropriately balanced against critical law enforcement and national security needs.
- (4) Recommending baseline standards for Federal Government use of biometric identification technologies, including facial recognition, voiceprint, gait recognition, and keyboard entry technologies.
- (5) Recommending baseline standards for the protection and integrity of data in the custody of the Federal Government.
- (6) Recommending proposals to address any gaps in Federal law or regulation with respect to facial recognition technologies in order to enhance protections of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights of individuals in the United States
- (7) Recommending best practices and contractual requirements to strengthen protections for privacy, information security, fairness, nondiscrimination, auditability, and accountability in artificial intelligence systems and technologies and associated data procured by the Federal Government.
- (8) Considering updates to and reforms of Government data privacy and retention requirements to address implications to privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights.
- (9) Assessing ongoing efforts to regulate commercial development and fielding of artificial intelligence and associated data in light of privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights implications, and as appropriate, considering and recommending institutional or organizational changes to facilitate applicable regulation.
- (10) Assessing the utility of establishing a new organization within the Federal Government to provide ongoing governance for and oversight over the fielding of artificial intelligence technologies by Federal agencies as technological capabilities evolve over time
- (d) ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.—In conducting the assessments required by paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c), the AI Task Force shall consider—
- (1) the organizational placement, structure, composition, authorities, and resources that a new organization would require to

- provide ongoing guidance and baseline standards for— $\,$
- (A) the Federal Government's development, acquisition, and fielding of artificial intelligence systems to ensure they comport with privacy, civil liberties, and civil rights and civil liberties law, including guardrails for their use: and
- (B) providing transparency to oversight entities and the public regarding the Federal Government's use of artificial systems and the performance of those systems;
- (2) the existing interagency and intraagency efforts to address AI oversight:
- (3) the need for and scope of national security carve outs, and any limitations or protections that should be built into any such carve outs: and
- (4) the research, development, and application of new technologies to mitigate privacy and civil liberties risks inherent in artificial intelligence systems.
 - (e) Reporting.—
- (1) INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the establishment of the AI Task Force, the AI Task Force shall prepare and submit an interim report to Congress and the President containing the AI Task Force's legislative and regulatory recommendations.
- (2) UPDATES.—The AI Task Force shall provide periodic updates to the President and to Congress.
- (3) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 18 months after the establishment of the AI Task Force, the AI Task Force shall prepare and submit a final report to the President and to Congress containing its assessment on organizational considerations, to include any recommendations for organizational changes.
- (f) OTHER EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES.—At any time before the submission of the final report under subsection (e)(3), the AI Task Force may recommend to Congress the creation of a similar task force focused on another emerging technology.
- (g) SUNSET.—The AI Task Force shall terminate on the date that is 18 months after the establishment of the Task Force.
- SA 1531. Mr. BARRASSO submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. Schumer to the bill S. 1260, to establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
- At the appropriate place in title V of division B, insert the following:

SEC. 25___. HA-LEU BANK.

- (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
- (1) HA-LEU.—The term "HA-LEU" means high-assay, low-enriched uranium.
- (2) HA-LEU BANK.—The term "HA-LEU Bank" means the HA-LEU Bank operated pursuant to the program.
- (3) HIGH-ASSAY, LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM.— The term "high-assay, low-enriched uranium" means uranium having an assay greater than 5.0 weight percent and less than 20.0 weight percent of the uranium-235 isotope.
- (4) PROGRAM.—The term "program" means the program established under subsection (b)(1).
- (5) SECRETARY.—The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Energy, acting

- through the Under Secretary for Science and Energy.
 - (b) Establishment.—
- (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall establish a program to operate a HA-LEU Bank in accordance with this section.
- (2) AUTHORITY.—In establishing the program and operating the HA-LEU Bank, the Secretary shall use the authority granted to the Secretary by sections 53, 63, and 161 g. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2201(g)).
- (c) Purposes.—The purposes of the HA-LEU Bank are—
- (1) to provide for the availability of domestically produced HA-LEU;
- (2) to address domestic nuclear supply chain issues; and
- (3) to support strategic nuclear fuel cycle capabilities in the United States.
- (d) EXCLUSION.—The Secretary shall exclude from the HA-LEU Bank uranium that is enriched by an entity that—
- (1) is owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation or the Government of the People's Republic of China; or
- (2) is organized under the laws of, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China.
- (e) FUNDING.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, out of any amounts appropriated pursuant to section 2117(a), there shall be made available to the Secretary to carry out this section \$150,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
- (f) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 2001(a)(2)(D) of the Energy Act of 2020 (42 U.S.C. 16281(a)(2)(D)) is amended—
- (1) in clause (v)(III), by adding "or" after the semicolon at the end:
- (2) by striking clause (vi); and
- (3) by redesignating clause (vii) as clause
- SA 1532. Mr. BARRASSO submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. SCHUMER to the bill S. 1260, to establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:
- At the appropriate place in title V of division B, insert the following:

SEC. 25 . NATIONAL STRATEGIC URANIUM RESERVE.

- (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
- (1) PROGRAM.—The term "program" means the program established under subsection (b)(1).
- (2) URANIUM RESERVE.—The term "Uranium Reserve" means the uranium reserve operated pursuant to the program.
- (3) SECRETARY.—The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Energy.
 - (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—
- (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall establish a program to operate a uranium reserve comprised of uranium recovered in the United States in accordance with this section.
- (2) AUTHORITY.—In establishing the program and operating the Uranium Reserve,

the Secretary shall use the authority granted to the Secretary by sections 53, 63, and 161 g. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2201(g)).

- (c) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Uranium Reserve are—
- (1) to address domestic nuclear supply chain issues:
- (2) to provide assurance of the availability of uranium recovered in the United States in the event of a supply disruption; and
- (3) to support strategic nuclear fuel cycle capabilities in the United States.
- (d) EXCLUSION.—The Secretary shall exclude from the Uranium Reserve uranium that is recovered in the United States by an entity that—
- (1) is owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation or the Government of the People's Republic of China; or
- (2) is organized under the laws of, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of, the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China.
- (e) FUNDING.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, out of any amounts appropriated pursuant to section 2117(a), there shall be made available to the Secretary to carry out this section \$150,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.

SA 1533. Mr. BARRASSO submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. SCHUMER to the bill S. 1260, to establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle A of title I of division C, add the following:

SEC. 3102. ADDRESSING RISK POSED BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

- (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
- (1) COUNTRY OF RISK.—
- (A) IN GENERAL.—The term "country of risk" means a foreign country the Secretary of Energy determines to present a risk of theft of United States intellectual property or a threat to the national security of the United States if nationals of the country participate in any research, development, demonstration, or deployment activity authorized under this Act or an amendment made by this Act.
- (B) CONSULTATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS.— In making determinations with respect to countries of risk under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall—
- (i) consult with the Director, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the National Security Council; and
- (ii) take into consideration—
- (I) the most recent World Wide Threat Assessment of the United States Intelligence Community, prepared by the Director of National Intelligence; and
- (II) the most recent National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States.
- (2) NATIONAL.—The term "national" has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
- (3) SECRETARY.—The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Energy.
 (b) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RISK MA-
- (b) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RISK MATRIX.—

- (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, in coordination with the Director and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, shall develop and maintain a Science and Technology Risk Matrix for any research, development, demonstration, or deployment activity authorized under this Act or an amendment made by this Act to facilitate determinations of the risk of theft of United States intellectual property or threat to the national security of the United States posed by each such activity.
- (2) CONTENT AND IMPLEMENTATION.—The matrix developed under paragraph (1) shall be developed, maintained, and used in a manner consistent with Department of Energy Order 142.3B (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act).
- (c) Prohibition on Nationals of Countries of Risk Participating in Research and Development Activities.—
- (1) IN GENERAL.—A national of a country of risk may not participate in any research, development, demonstration, or deployment activity authorized under this Act or an amendment made by this Act.
- (2) PENALTIES.—Any person that receives funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act that is found to be in violation of paragraph (1) shall be prohibited from receiving Federal funding for a period of 10 years after being found in violation of paragraph (1).
 - (d) ENTITY OF CONCERN PROHIBITION.—
- (1) IN GENERAL.—No entity described in paragraph (2) or person affiliated with such an entity may receive or participate in any grant, award, program, support, or other activity authorized under this Act or an amendment made by this Act.
- (2) ENTITIES DESCRIBED.—An entity described in this paragraph is any entity—
- (A) identified under section 1237(b) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note);
- (B) identified under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283); or
- (C) on the Entity List maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.
- (e) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 240 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary and the Director shall jointly submit to Congress a report that—
- (1) describes-
- (A) the extent to which nationals of countries of risk are participating in research and development activities of the Department of Energy or the Foundation; and
- (B) the disciplines of those research and development activities;
- (2) includes a mitigation plan for ensuring nationals of countries of risk do not participate in any future or ongoing research and development activities of the Department of Energy or the Foundation; and
- (3) defines critical research areas, classified by risk, as determined by the Secretary and the Director.

SA 1534. Mr. BARRASSO submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. SCHUMER to the bill S. 1260, to establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to es-

tablish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle C of title I of division C, add the following:

SEC. 3124. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF POWER INVERTERS FROM COUNTRIES FROM WHICH CYBERATTACKS ON UNITED STATES CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE ORIGINATE.

- (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report identifying each country—
- (1) for which there is reason to believe that cyberattacks on critical energy infrastructure in the United States have originated in that country during any of the 3 calendar years preceding the submission of the report and such cyberattacks have persisted after notification to that country; and
- (2) in which power inverters are manufactured or assembled that are imported into the United States.
- (b) PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION.—On and after the date that is 60 days after the submission of the report required by subsection (a), the importation of power inverters from any country identified in the report is prohibited.
- (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term "appropriate congressional committees" means—
- (1) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
- (2) the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Natural Resources, the Committee on Homeland Security, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

SA 1535. Mr. BARRASSO (for himself, Mr. Daines, Ms. Murkowski, and Ms. Lummis) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 1502 proposed by Mr. SCHUMER to the bill S. 1260, to establish a new Directorate for Technology and Innovation in the National Science Foundation, to establish a regional technology hub program, to require a strategy and report on economic security, science, research, innovation, manufacturing, and job creation, to establish a critical supply chain resiliency program, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title III of division ${\bf F},$ add the following:

SEC. 63 . TECHNOLOGY GRANTS TO STRENGTHEN DOMESTIC MINING WORKFORCE.

- (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
- (1) BYPRODUCT.—The term "byproduct" has the meaning given the term in section 7002(a) of the Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606(a)).
- (2) CRITICAL MINERAL.—The term "critical mineral" has the meaning given the term in section 7002(a) of the Energy Act of 2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606(a)), except that the term shall not exclude materials described in paragraph (3)(B)(iii) of that section.
- (3) MINING SCHOOL.—The term "mining school" means—